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106 COMPARATIVE CIVll..IZATIONS REVIEW 
Thrner and Frontier Values: Optimistic Postindustrial 
Enclaves in China and Silicon Valley 
Jan E nglish-Lueck, Ph.D . 
... . . Turner's spirit, if not his ghost, is sti ll around. "1 
1993 was the centennial year ofFrederick Jackson Turner 's Chicago pre­
miere of the frontier thesis. engendering a century of debate. Noting that 
enduri ng controversy, the Twelfth Oklahoma Symposium on Comparative 
Frontier Studies set an agenda to reexami ne Turner from the vantage points 
of anthropology, archaeology, geography, and history in regional arenas as 
diverse as Imperial Rome, medieval Gem1any, Apachean America, 
Polynesia, and the postmodern frontiers in China and Silicon Valley. z This 
exploration into the multidisciplinary world of comparative fro ntier research 
was provocative. The seminal argument made a century ago by Frederick 
Jackson Turner still echoes in several areas of my own discipline, psycho­
logical anthropology. 
Although there are many flaws in Turner's models of causation, and his 
data, nonetheless the attempt to understand the connection between parental 
homeland and frontier. the former being a mature, often more closed system 
and the latter characteristicaJJy being more open. Further, he was concerned 
with the impact of that transformation on national character. Such issues are 
of critical interest to psychological anthropologists and cross-cultural psy­
chologists. My objective here is to apply some of the insights of anthropol­
ogy and psychology to the Turner's frontier thesis. 
The strands of his argument are varied and intertwined. Some statements 
attempt to explain causal relationships; other reveal the worldview of the 
historian's people or the people studied. Additionally, the latter, an idealized 
description of worldview must be distinguished from the lived behavior of 
actual people. A hypothesis postulating the generation of innovation on fron­
tiers is not the same as the val uing of innovation as a ideal virtue. Nor does 
the existence of innovative people require that the trait be highly valued in 
a particular culture. 
These distinctions will be explored using two case studies of postindus­
trial frontiers-advance enclaves of high technology in previously agrarian 
arenas. These case studies will be taken from ethnographic s tudies of mod­




Can Turner's thesis be revitalized so that the core of his provocative 
ideas can continue to provoke meaningful discussions of intercultural fron­
tiers? The task is challenging since Turner's thesis of frontier ethnogenesis 
is imbedded in nineteenth century conve ntions-moral posturing, nativism. 
and romanticism-transformed by twentieth century revisions. The thesis 
blended models of naive evolutionism-postulating waves of settlement that 
recapitulated evolutionary economic development (ttade, farming, industry) 
that have been Lransfonned in modern discourse into economic typologies. 
or fTontier "types." 
He noted several features descriptive of nineteenth century America-a 
moving line (Zone) of settlement and a highly migratory population, geo­
graphically if not economically mobile. He promoted the myth of "free 
land," ignoring the forces of capitalism and the social costs of dispossessing 
the indigenous peoples. He postulated a social control mechanism in which 
the frontier acted as a safety valve for the lower classes and immigrant labor. 
Finally he offered a causal model in which the rigors of the pioneering 
process produced the values intrinsic to the American "national character"­
democratization, individuation, innovation, optimism.9 That aspect of 
Thrner's hypothesis attempted to explore the connection between the rela­
tively fluid open frontier social organization and psychocultural values of 
optim ism, individualism,< innovation,s risk-taking and pragmatisrn.6 These 
are iss ues that explore the relations hip of culture and personality. 
The central issue now is how to resolve the tension between a lively 
interest in jntercultural boundaries, past and present, with the cullural bag­
gage ofTurner's frontier thesis-rampant individualism, colonialism, chau­
vinism, and boosterism. One technique would be to S[O!J examining the indi­
vidual traits of Turner's American frontier as the exemplar of a valid fron­
tier and turn to a processual approach.In the historiography of the 1950s this 
effort was s timulated hy Webb's publication of The Great Frontier that revi­
talized the discussion of the frontier concept writ large, expanding the defi­
nition of what constitutes a frontier.7 The use of general systems approaches 
in historical archaeology also broadened the cross-cultural application of 
frontier phenomena.8 Cultural dynamism is the premise behind the decades 
old processual approach in archaeology in which classification and descrip­
tion are replaced by models positing cultural interaction and environmental 
adaptation. In frontier studies the emphasis is placed on identifying the 
processes of the frontier phenomena instead of classifying a particular fron­
tier along epistemologically jumbled traits-economic type. migratory pat­
tern or ethos. ln the processual approach frontiers are active z.ones of human 
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interaction. Thompson and Lamar identify it as "zone or territory of inter­
penetration between two previously distinct societies. Usually one of the 
societies is indjgenous. . .or at least has occupied it for many generations . 
. A frontier opens when the first representatives of the intrusive society 
arrive.' '9 
That defini tion requires further discussion to distinguish frontier 
processes from any other intercultural contact. Does the migration of entre­
preneurial Australians or Americans into Singapore or Hong Kong constitute 
a frontier? It is an intercultural contact of mostly distinct cultures, but one 
that Jacks the cultural instabitity and boundary ambiguity of a frontier. The 
defirution of frontier is requires more qualification. Frontiers are imercul­
tural contacts that must be characterized by cultural or geographic condi­
tions that limit the range of human activity due either to lack of familiar 
resources or "stretched" social resources in whlcb old patterns of social 
orgaruzation (oligarchy, feudalism, tribute) are incomplete in the new 
venue. Note that the presence or absence of resources or old social patterns 
is not as significant as the cultural perception of those fea tures. Hispanic 
Californios did not eat the prime food ofCalifornia natives, acorns, because 
they did not perceive it as a resource . Instead they transplanted European 
and Mexican notions of resource adequacy-redefinin g California's bounty. 
Similarly the once functional landed oligarchy of the 1840s was insufficient 
for the influx of immigrants and economic chaos wrought by the California 
Gold Rush. Thus intercultural contacts were made under conditions of 
ambiguity and flux, creating a frontier. Such a processual model bui lding is 
characteristic of the etic approach in anthropology-an approach wh ich 
draws on a cultural outsider's conclusions based on a larger scientific model 
ofcausation or as a consequence of comparison. 10 Models that postulate that 
multicultural interaction generates ethnogenesis, the creation or dramatic 
reformation of cultures11 are etic ones. Etic models become conceptually 
slippery when they concern cognitive processes or psychological values 
s uch as pragmatism or innovation which Turner postulates are the result of 
scarcity. Discussions of such issues may pass imperceptibly into the realm 
of the "ernie," drawing on the internal perceptions and models of the stud­
ied people. The outside assessment fades into the internal worldview of a 
given fron tier. In his discussion of the creation of individualism, innova­
tion and egalitarian values on the frontier is Turner postulating a historio­
grapruc model or exposing his nineteenth century Midwestern American 
worldview in which the frontier ethos is a tonic for weary fin de siecle 
Americans? It is important to separate the observations and assessments 
made about fTontiers from the beliefs held by the members of a particular 
frontier group. Turner freely mixes these in his thesis, to the confusion of 
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s ubsequent generations of scholars. It is also necessary to separate world­
view, the emic models that people believe, from thei r daily bebavior.'2 For 
example, historians have pointed out widespread communitarian behavior 
on the s upposedly individualist American frontier,l1 but this would not 
negate the value attributed to individualism by the people themselves. 
Worldview contains the principles we value, not to be confused with our 
daily action s that might bear out or contradjct tbe dominant values or 
emphasis one set of values in one arena of life, and its opposite in another. 
The cen tral process to be explored in this paper is the link between an 
open social organization and the generation of values. Sucb an exercise in 
model building yields issues of causation, correlatio n and selection. 
Managing Risk in Open and Closed Societies 
The inspiration for my ini tial, more processual approach came from Don 
Brown 's book, History, Hierarchy and Human Nature. A social anthropolo­
gist who has long studied Brunei, he noted di stinct differences in the histo­
riographic traditions of India and China. He expanded his empirical base to 
include a number of other groups. He noted that the Imperial Chinese, 
Burmese, Viet namese, Renaissance Florentines. Classical Muslims. 
Hebrews, Assy rian s, Babylonians, Ionian Greeks, Medieval Byzanti nes and 
late Republican/early Imperial Romans had relatively sound historiogra­
phy-strong in biography and political detail. The Javanese, Balinese, 
Malayans, Indians, Sassinid Persians, late Egyptians, Homeric Greeks, 
Classical Spartans, late Western Imperial Romans, Feudal European s and 
Renaissance Venetian s had historiographic materials that were more mythi c 
and less focused on social descripti on. The upshot of this argument is that 
open social structures, in which more social mobility could occur, would 
invest more in their historiographies. Hi story. like divinati on, functioned as 
a form of risk management, making the shifting patterns of social power 
more comprehensibl e and hence more manageable.'" 1n societies with little 
social mobility, such as caste or closed peasant systems, ideological purity 
was more important since "divining" the fo rces of change would little 
behoove them. Open societies were associated with strong conception s of 
the individual while closed societies focused on an ascribed , inborn social 
ranking system.'~ 
Extending this argument to t11e frontier requires very little mental gym ­
nastics. To both indigenous peoples and colonists the pre-contact rules o f 
social organization are changed, for good or ill. The system is des tabilized , 
creating risk , and the perception of risk. Ifpeople believe they require supe­
rior risk management, what are their options? If Brown is correct in his 
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hypothesis, superior historiography is one solution. Other sociocultural val­
ues might also prove useful-such as pragmatism, conscious ethnogenesis, 
strong future time orientation and most of all, optimism. 
Thls kind of model does not lend itself to the discovery of primary caus­
es. In such a complex system. the causatiooal links are. dare I say. function­
al. Like models of learning or natural selection, we are talking about selec­
tion by consequences not the wholesale origins of values. The values must 
have existed, in some form, before they can be subject to selection. 
In a selection by consequences model, the origin of the behavior pre­
cedes its selection, just as an anatomical feature of a species must exist 
before it is selected for or against by environmental feedback. The loosen­
ing of social structural constJ:aints does not create these frontier values, any 
more than it caused the Imperial Chinese to improve their historiography. 
But open systems do select for those elements in the existing worldview that 
the inhabitants believe are helpful. This js a core problem in the original 
Turnerian thesis in which he implied that the frontier created these values, 
unconnected to the "cultural baggage" of the colonist's European heritage.16 
This was a position he later appears to have reconsidered.17 
To make mauers even more complicated, simple functional models of 
feedback systems do not work well with cultural beings. We cannot assume 
that values or behavior are indeed the result of positive environmental feed· 
back. We can convince ourselves that somet hing is useful when it may not 
be. A purely functional approach is insufficient. The perception of useful­
ness, rather than the actual success of a value, may help perpetuate that 
worldview. Indeed, in psychology, jntermittent reinforcement appears to 
increase optimism18 and risk· taking. 1Y Real innovation or success is only 
loosely connected with the cultural va lue ofoptimism. Rather than being an 
ultimate cause of world view creation, frontiers may function as a proximate 
cause of worldview selection, which can be quite subtle. Such an inquiry 
begs for tangible illustrations. 
China and Silicon Valley- Two Post-Industrial Frontiers 
My choice of examples may seem unorthodox , for cosmopolitan or 
industrial boundaries tend to be left out of the Turnerian discourse on fron­
tiers.20 They are not insular, nor do they have a clear frontier line, but repre­
sent the clash ofdjfferent cultures formed around distinct economic special­
ties, rapidly coming in and out of existence. My case studies take the con­
cept of an industrial frontier one step further to the penetration of hlgh tech ­




My information on China came primarily from fieldwork done in thl~ 
People's Republic of China. as well as academic research done at the 
University of Hong Kong from 1993-1994. 1also collected over a hundred 
interviews with Chinese intellectuals from 1988-1990. l used the 
Ethnographjc Futures Research (EFR) technique to elicit images of the best. 
worst and most probable futures of Chinese science, education and society. 
Such images highlight the values and cogni ti ve models of the informants.1' 
The informants were drawn from individuals hailing from all parts of China, 
particularly the industrial Northeast, the inner technological centers of the 
Southwest, and of course. Beijing and Shanghai. Other regions were repre­
sented only fractionally less, except for the largely agrarian and ethnic 
Northwest. Beyond Shanghai and Beijing, there is little geographic concen­
tration of Chinese. scientists. Most are dispersed in loosely connected nodes 
governed by the needs of the centralized state. Market incenti ves arc just 
now malcing an entre into institute and university enclaves. The Chinese do 
not much value the frontier image and it is not a self-conscious appellation. 
Wrule technological careers offer a social mobility of sorts. geographic 
mobility is still very much constrained. 
The intellectuals interviewed were primarily technologists and research 
scientists, with a smattering of social scientists and historians , They placed 
a high value on technology itself as a key feature of their identity. 
Technological expertise defines these pragmatic scholars as an emerging 
class, distinct from the literati of the past. ln the interviews they were con­
cerned about their future as a group, s ubject to conflicl.ing political and eco~ 
nomic policies and ambiguous social status. although they were generally 
optimistic within a time framework of one or two generations. 
The Chinese technological comm unity does not see itself as a frontier. 
Although the scientific fron tier image has been internationally implanted, 
the designation of"frontier" is etic, not ernie, for it is derived from their sys­
remic dynamics as I assess them , rather than being their own self-evalua­
tion. Crunese scientists, as active interfaces with the West, function along a 
cultural boundary, acting as exp lorers and middl emen. 
Their function is simil ar to the European early medieval monks, who 
were also point men on a cultural interface and have been described as 
' 'frontiersmen" in the frontier literature (see Figure 1).22 Those monks, liv­
ing on the boundaries of Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christian com­
munities, redefined an number of symbolic markers of identity. Tn the early 
Third century, the conservalive writings of Augustine and more radical 
Cassian, redefined the cosmology of monastic life. in effect creating a syn­
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Figure 1. Frontier Driven Selection of Values on the 
Postindustrial Frontiers of Silicon Valley and Intellectual China 
''Traditional" Value Sets 
China's Intellectuals Silicon Valley 
•Optimism, progress •Optimism 
•Scientism •Scientism. technocracy 





Enter Frontier Dynamics 
China's Intellectuals Silicon Valley 
Dispersed, interstitial 
cultural frontier analo­




gous to 19th century 
mining communities 
Selection and Intensification of Values 
China's Intellectuals & 
Silicon Valley 
Increase optimism-in the abstract 
Increase clarity of risk-in daily life 
Individualism-focus on self and 
nuclear family as actors 
Pragmatism (self-interest and 
realpolitik over ideals) 
Work ethics enhanced 
Strong future orientation 
Strong self-identification as a special 
and unique group of people 
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thesis of contemplative and active goals. Humankind, once envisioned as 
sacred by the non-Christian philosophers, had become cosmologically taint­
ed with sin and degeneration. The Augustinian vision of a like-minded com­
muniry ofdedicated Christians, was designed to mitigate the legacy of inher­
ent wickedness. Conversio to the monastic calling was to ·'proclaim the pos­
sibility of a new social identity."2) The monks aided in defining the risks of 
daily life as inherently "sinful, condemned by nature to suffering, and utter­
ly dependent on God":o.& and then created a mechanism for controlling that 
risk, monastic conversion and subsequent education of laymen. Monks 
thereby created a means for brokering the cultural transition to the Christian 
worldview. This was echoed by the geographic redefinition of "sacred 
space" as once polluting remains-saintly relics- -were sanctilied and 
brought into the Roman towns. This ultimately created a network of sacred 
sites that formed the geographic basis of that frontier.~' 
In the Western monastic tradition. new fonns of social organizations 
were invented, from the Cassian inspired Benedictine ranks-based on obe­
dience and hard work-to the nomadic clan based monasteries of the early 
Celtic Church.26 Both in turn contributed to the creation of economically 
productive, of"modem" farmer monks advocated by Gregory on the cusp of 
the Fifth century. Those monks. many coming from a non- fanning back­
ground. innovated by introducing vineyards, hedges, ditches, founding 
towns and developing local markets Y This practical-minded, even if spiri­
tually defined group, displayed the creati vity and self- consciousness asso­
ciated with the frontier.28 
The Chinese intellectuals occupy a cosmopolitan frontier, largely virtu­
al, i.e. defined by interest and function, with dispersed interstitial clusters29 
of academics and technologists. Their frontier consists of pockets of post in­
dustrialists, surrounded by a dominant culture focused on industry and agri­
culture. 
An open-ended elicitation of the best future for Chinese technology 
yielded a variety of results. Yet, within the diversity of response, there was 
remarkable coherence. The discussion of technology dominated the best sce­
nario. Technology, at least in the abstract, is the key to China's moderniza­
tion effort and the key to the rehabilitation of intellectuals who were once 
severely stigmatized in the Cultural Revolution. ln discussing their probable 
scenarios, the tone and content were nearly identical to tl1e best scenarios. 
When technology cropped up in the worst scenarios, only rarely was it char­
acterized by the absence of rapid development in technology. 
The latter feature puzzled me enough tO pursue it during the interviews. 
When I would ask about the possibility of less technology, I would meet dis­
may. Technological progress was inevitable. I would be told. It may be ham­
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pered by poverty or policies that would interfere with intellectuals' work and 
status, but it would occur. The probable scenarios were repeatedly charac­
terized as 80% of the best scenario. This startling optimism-perhaps less 
s tarUing in light of the Marxist notions of progress, or Conf ucian ideals of 
self-cultivation-was largely based on tec hnology and increased material 
prosperity. Sclentism, optimism and personal duty were clearly core Chinese 
values that were shared by the marginalized intellectuals.><• Within this cui~ 
turaJ environment of marginality and mediation. the frontier values of inno­
vation, risk-taking, etcetera, are the functional elements of a frontier world­
view. 
Those Chinese ''frontie rsmen'' take care not to advertise thi s point of 
view, since those attitudes are not particularly valued by the Chinese elite, 
and their intercultural contact is viewed with suspicion as foreign spiri tual 
pollution.'' This is a case where the frontier ethos develops as a result of sys­
temic dynamics, but it is not a conscious self designation. Unlike Turner's 
nineteenth century Americans. being on the late twentieth century Chinese 
intercultural frontier carries no romantic overtone. 
Silicon Boom Town 
The material on Silicon Valley, Cali fornia is at an earlier stage of analy~ 
sis. My colleagues and I have finished a third of our decade long project 
examining the distinctive c ultural features of that region- its ethn ic diversi~ 
ty, technological orientation and global self- definition. The research is col­
laborative, combining efforts of diverse academicians at San Jose State 
University, often using student researchers in a distributed "field scbool" 
across the anthropology curriculum. Data sources include Lhe official dis­
course fro m popular treatises, institutional record and observations made at 
pubJjc meetings. Field observations, and interviews on intercultural con­
tacts, public and corporate policy and visions of the future are key ethno­
graphic elements in this a pproach. Beyond the general forays into the com­
munity, efforts are directed to people and groups involved with two institu­
tions-the Tech Mu seum of Innovation (engineers, educato rs and non-prof­
it staff) and Joint Venture Silicon Valley (a community wide corporate-gov­
ernment partnership). 
Silicon Valley is a cluster of communities whose hi gh- tech economic 
niche has thrust them onto the world stage. For the denizens of Silicon val­
ley, to be the frontier of the twenty-first century is a muc h heralded prize, 
highly valued by the local elite. Social, career and geographic mobility are 
the essence of the Silicon ValJey lifestyle. 
Sili con Valley is geographically ambiguous-narrowly defined as the 
liS 
Santa C lara Valley, broadly described as California's Bay Area. If the sci­
entific and technological institutes of China are reminiscent of the intersti­
tial cosmological penetration of medieval monks, then Silicon Valley can 
clearly be ILkened to the cosmopolitan mining communities of the nineteenth 
and twentieth century American West. Both are localized, and fit a unique 
geographic and temporal economic niche. '2 Like the mining communities of 
the nineteenth century, the boom economy of high technology has attracted 
a specialized diverse ethnic population.n 1n both community types booster­
ism bolsters economic confidence ... Both yield a plethora of racial and eth­
nic stereotypes that allow people to cognitively manage, albeit perniciously. 
the ambiguity and chaos of living in an culturally diverse society. 
Such communities have a dramatic history of economic expansion and 
contraction. The denizens of Silicon Valley recognize the analogy and while 
they enjoy the boom, the implications of the possible bust make them 
uncomfortable. So they hasten to defend themselves as the information 
motherload which cannot be played out, and they herald ever increasing 
opportunity in communications, biotechnology and environmental technol­
ogy. This places them in a quandary. however, for even though competition 
from other cities looms large in their stated fears, they do not like to recog­
nize the vulnerability that stems from this lack of a fixed material resource. 
After all, while tbere may be opportunity in biotechnology that advantage 
need not be confined to Silicon Valley. 
Why should Seattle not be the site of the nex t bonanza? So the Silicon 
VaHey elite shift the discourse from technology itself to "human capital." 
They emphasize that only they have the density of expertise and personal 
interconnections between diverse industries. Only they have the critical 
mass of research universities that produce new knowledge, state universities 
that train the new workforce, and the diverse large and small tirms (fTOm 
ffiM, Apple and Hewlett- Packard to mercurial family firms run by tempo­
rary immigrants from Taiwan) that breed a broad range of skills. Technology 
and technological industry pervade the self- conception of this region. 
Repeatedly, Silicon Valley is called the "Lourdes for the scientists of the 
electronic revolution,"" a realm of intellectual capital ''like nowhere else on 
earth,".l<t "a nursery for future technologies,"31 echoing the "hum of Jabs.''1~ It 
represents the mythic "village-like technology community""' so romantical­
ly invoked by late twentieth century futurists. 
Even though they occupy the same locale, Silicon Valley has a distinct 
historical identity. The postindustrial myth comes with its own history, dis­
tinct from the one marketed at the Santa Clara County Historical Society. 
Traditional Santa Clara history begins citing the native Ohlone and ends just 
as industrial development begins in the former "Valley of Heart's Desire." 
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Silicon Valley's history begins in the late thirties witb " the garage" of Bill 
Hewlett and Dave Packard. building their first product, an audio oscillator 
to be used in Walt Disney 's Fantasia.40 "Folk" renditions describe the 
exploits of cowboy hackers from Noyce's 1959 patenting of the integrated 
circuit and the era of aerospace'' to Jobs and Wozniak of Apple fame_ 
In Silicon Valley, Turner's romantic frontier imagery is lovingly invoked. 
ln a synoptic hJstory of Silicon Valley, frontier images abound-''Valley 
Days, Go West. Garage-era pioneers. Cowboy entrepreneurs.''41 Local 
CEOs, corporate elite, use frontier image laden phrases s uch as ''threshold"~' 
and "uncharted technological territories ..... Like Turner a century ago, 
Silicon Valley pundits warn of the passivity and civilization that wjJl Lake 
away the frontier edge,.osinstead suggesting that the valley must continue to 
·•push the envelope."~ ThJ s frontier self- conception is an essential part of 
the local ethos. In this model. education's chief, if not it's only purpose, is 
to create the workforce of tomorrow. That workforce is envisioned to con­
sist of fas t-paced risk-takers. Moreover, they should be independent 
thinkers. but loyal and group- oriented. At the same time. all parties-man­
agement and workers, includjng intellectual workers-would seek to maxi­
mize their own self-interest by shifting positions. It is the archetypal "open 
social structure." 
Recently, the "collaborative coalition" Joint Venture Silicon Valley pro­
moted an effort to combine private and public sectors to reinvent and revi ­
talize the region. Tbe group has expounded three visions of the future, close~ 
ly corresponding with best, worst and most probable scenarios. The opti­
mistic vision. given the " win-win'' score. is the "American Technopolis ... 
Innovation and regional economic strength are combined. The local work­
force is more comfortable, secure and better equipped to serve economic 
growth. The worst fonnulation is " High-Tech Manhattan" in which there is 
higb corporate profitability, but the technological edge is gone, Leaving a 
declining economy and infrastructure in its wake. The most probable for­
mulation is the "Virtual Va1Jey" in which decentralized, "lean" enterprises 
change swiftJy to service new niches. Growth does nol take place wi Uun the 
valley. but elsewhere. The community suffers, however, ac; income and 
employment decline and a two-tiered economy stresses the commun.ity.•7 
Essential to the ernie models of risk is the sense that image is more 
important than actuality. Silicon Valley must appear to be innovative and 
cutting edge. Lack of consumer confidence is perhaps more dangerous to 
frontier dynamism than physical infrastructural problems. This tension was 
highlighted by the March 1993 unveiling of forty-one "candidate flagsbip 
initiatives'' to save Silicon Valley- the most dramatic suggested new 
telecommunications clearinghouses and networks.4 Technology and innova­
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tioo must come to the rescue. Other initiatives were plainly designed to 
boost the image of the community regardless of the real constraints. 
Optimism was to be kept afloat by marketing techniques if necessary. The 
other values assodated with this Silicon Valley image are the often repeated 
innovation, risk-raking, high lime pace and ephemerality. Underneath is the 
unquestioned optimism of a high technology future. Even in the throes of 
mid-recession reassessment, whi le the public and private leaders of the com­
munity worry about maintaining dominance over Austin, Singapore and 
Tsukuba, there is never any hint that technology might not prevail. The tech­
no-optimism is deeply imbedded. While scientism, technocracy, optimism 
and individualism were hardly absent from the repertoire of values in the 
pre-boom Californian culture-there is certainly a shift in the intensity of 
these values. 
Amplified Frontier Values 
What cognitive model supports this incorrigible techno- opllm•sm. so 
intermittently reinforced by experienced reality? The recurring themes of 
innovation, boosterism, risk-taking, multiculturalism and elhnogenesis, 
whjJe brisWng against constraining regulation and policy, remind us ofother 
historical frontiers:~ These are the emotive and cognitive qualities associat­
ed with Frederick Jackson Turner's nineteenth century conception of the 
American West. These values and images are consciously emulated in 
Silicon Valley. 
Less consciously, but nonetheless, the frontier image is also a feature of 
lbe Chinese scientific community. Given this comparative sample, can we 
illuminate the connection between values and the postindustrial frontier 
enclaves and parental core communities? Both Chinese and Californian 
communities have deep roots into values noted for the frontier-optimism 
and pragmatism-and both have extensively elaborated on those values. T he 
features mentioned for the "core, parental'' societies of Chinese non- intel­
lectuals and pre-Cold War California provided the cultural baggage from 
which pieces were selected and enlarged (see agaio Figure l). Optimism is 
enhanced as an elemenc of abstract world view, but interviewees rarely con­
nect their positive visions wich quotidian experiences in essence sayi ng that 
"life will be good'' but "my life is now filled with chaos and work." 
Risk is assessed more carefully. Worst case scenarios are clearer and 
more obviously linked with the daily lives of the Chinese intellectuals and 
Silicon Valley denizens. Individualism is enhanced. l t makes Chinese schol­
ars suspect to the conservative core, but nonetheless gives them opportuni­
ties to change their social status in the absence of political power. 
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Confucian Work Dynamism,~• in which work becomes en twined with 
self-cultivation and familial success, is enhanced for Chinese sc ientists. 
Their work then becomes the edifice for their rehabilitation by demonstrat­
ing their usefulness to the cultural core. Individualism underpins percep­
tions of entrepreneurial success in Silicon Valley. j' Tn Silicon Valley, the pre­
vailing urban myth is that if you are not working eighty hours a week, you 
are doomed. Individual work achievement is the basis of social s uccess and 
economic survival. family and community can provide little security. Work 
ethics in both communities are amplified. Both cosmopolitan frontiers are 
strongly future oriented. ln the Chinese interviews the thirty year future 
lime-frame offered In the Ethnographic Futures Research format was regu­
larly extended another ten to fifty years as people imagined the futu re. In 
Silicon Valley the official position posits that to plan for today is to fail, only 
anticipating the culling edge of a decade hence will keep the community in 
the lead. 
Both China's scientists and Silicon Valley pundits are ruthlessly prag ­
matic in their future scenarios and life histories, taking opportunities where 
they can be found. for example, Chinese scientists can bypass the ideologi­
cal constraints of the Chinese Communist Party line by using the back door 
through guanxi (co nnections) or advancing through the open door to the 
wider world. I n Silicon Valley humanism and environmentalism, although 
ideally valued is discourse and interviews, take second place to survival and 
self-interest. 
Finally, both post industrial frontiersmen have consciously deli.ned 
themselves as unjque, important, special and deserving of note, an attitude 
that lakes us full circle back to the impulse to use hjstoriography as a tool 
for assessing and understanding their own chances in the wider world. Both 
groups-Chinese intellectuals and Silicon Valley techies-have constructed 
a soc ial history to reify their existence. 
While a strong causal statement would be difficult to issue, clearly there 
is a dynamic acting on both communities that enhances "Turnerian" style 
values in situations fraught with flux, change and perceived opportunities. 
These dynamics are visible on the grossest level, although the range of val­
ues certainly extends beyond the obvious. 
Let me suggest directions for further exploration. New field studies in 
anthropology. sociology and history can perhaps enhance our understanding 
of the nuances of that selective process. We must be careful not to fall into 
the functionalist trap of assuming that the mere presence of a value system 
indicates it success as <lid Turner on occasion.n Moreover, as the wide range 
of example ind icates. there is no mys terious cultural determinism at work. 
While there may be gross similarities. monks, miners, technologists in 
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California or China aiJ differ in the meaning, interpretation and enaction of 
concepts such as risk management, pragmatism, or strong self-identification. 
They need not express all the values listed. Other cultural factors, separate 
from frontier dynamics might prevail. The Augustinian vision of monasti­
c ism was clearly not individualistic, nor do we have the information to know 
how decisions were made in daily life. Without that. the presence or absence 
of individualism-making self and immediate family the prime factors in 
decision making-might he impossible to determine. 
There are related issues that beg for clarification. What values are inter­
nally contradictory within frontier worldviews? Silicon Valley denizens 
work at believing themselves unique and simultaneously fear competition. 
Cttinese scientists must present themselves as rehabilitated "workers," not a 
new elite, yet they do not really believe this to be true. How are these views 
reconciled? Finally, when his torians and anthropologists make the leap from 
self- reponed worldviews to actual behavior-how do these values enact 
themselves in daily life? These would be fruitful areas for understanding the 
psychological anthropology of Turner's frontier thesis. 
San Jose State University. 
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